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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
A horizontal merger is defined as a merger in which the merging 
companies sell closely relatea products in the same geographic market 
(29, p. 123). Since the merging firms are competitors, a horizontal 
merger can have an impact on the competitive condition of the market. 
In the 1950 s, the number of mergers involving commercial banks 
rose substantially and has been high ever since. This rise in bank 
mergers has caused some concern as to the competitive impact of these 
mergers. Many economists and bank regulators see a trend towards 
increasing concentration in banking markets due to these mergers. 
The purpose of this study is to examine the change in a bank's 
market share post-merger. If two banks merge, the resultant bank will 
obviously have a greater market share than either of the two individual 
banks. The focus of this study is not to look at this increase in market 
share but instead to look at the change in market share of the resultant 
or merged bank in a seven year time period following the merger. If 
banks that participate in mergers are more aggressive in their market, 
one would expect their market share to rise post-merger. However, a 
number of factors could influence how market share changes over time. In 
this study, such variables as the type of branching allowed in the resul­
tant bank's state, the bank's size and holding company affiliation, as 
well as other variables, are tested for their possible impact on bank 
market share. These factors are tested using simple linear regression 
techniques. 
Chapter II provides an overview of the regulation and regulators 
of commercial banks, with an emphasis on the area of structural regula­
tion In banking. These structural regulations concern: 
1) Branching by banks 
2) Bank holding companies 
3) Bank mergers. 
Since the focus of this study Is on bank market share, how the 
market Itself Is defined in banking is Important to the results. Chapter 
III reviews some of the literature concerning competition in banking 
markets and how those markets are defined, both as to product and geo­
graphically. Special attention is given to the studies done on the 
effect of bank mergers on competition and overall market structure. 
The data base used and the sample selection process are described 
in Chapter IV, along with the results of regressions testing the change 
in market share and the impact of the factors mentioned previously. 
Three different Independent variables are used to describe market share 
and how it changes: market share in 1980, absolute change in market 
share from 1972-1973 to 1980 and relative change in market share from 
1972-1973 to 1980. The geographic market definition used for the mergers 
in this study is the county or Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area 
(SMSA) in which the resultant bank is locafed; the product market 
variable is demand deposits of individuals, partnerships and corporations 
(DIPC). 
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Chapter V summarizes the results and discusses some of the public 
policy Implications of these results. Avenues of future research are 
also discussed. 
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CHAPTER II: THE BANKING INDUSTRY 
Throughout the history of the United States, banking has been a 
regulated industry. The main reason for the existence of this regulation 
is to try to avoid bank failure. One end result of a competitive frame­
work is that the less efficient firm is driven out of business by its 
more efficient competitor. Risk of business failure is part of the game. 
But bank failure carries with it higher social costs than does failure 
in most other industries. 
In comparison to most other firms, banks operate with a small amount 
of owners' equity, usually about ten percent. In such a highly leveraged 
firm, the incentive to take risks is high since the loss primarily accrues 
to the depositors and the gains to the stockholders (18). Therefore, a 
bank failure, by imposing losses on the depositors, can potentially 
disrupt the payments mechanism by causing the populace to distrust the 
financial system. 
Since bank failure has severe consequences, the regulation in banking 
Is designed to insure the safety of the Individual bank (and therefore 
the depositors' money). Unlike most regulated industries, such as an 
electrical utility, which are regulated as to the price they charge, bank 
regulation is not primarily price oriented. Some restrictions on price 
do exist, such as Regulation Q which limits the amount of Interest banks 
may pay on time deposits. However, the Depository Institutions Deregula­
tion and Monetary Control Act of 1980 calls for a gradual lifting of this 
ceiling on interest rates over the next six years. There also exists 
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at the state level some restrictions on the interest rate that is charged 
on loans, known as usury. But with the move towards deregulation of 
financial institutions, many states are loosening these restrictions. 
Bank regulation tries to promote bank safety through periodic bank 
examinations, which check on the bank's compliance with the various 
regulations relating to the riskiness of the bank's loan portfolio and 
other investments. Banks are also subject to antitrust laws which will 
be discussed later. 
The Regulators 
There are primarily four bank regulators: at the federal level, 
the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Reserve System, and the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and at the state level, the various 
state banking commissions. The reason for the existence of four different 
regulators lies in the institutional structure of banking. 
The United States banking system is classified as a dual banking 
system, which refers to two possible sources of a bank's charter. By 
law, in order to operate, a bank is required to have a charter from 
either the Comptroller of the Currency or the relevant state banking 
authority. If the charter comes from the Comptroller of the Currency, 
the bank is a national bank; if the charter comes from the state, it is 
a state bank. The bank's regulator, however, is not solely determined 
by who granted the charter. 
One of the other agencies which could perhaps have jurisdiction 
over the bank is the Federal Reserve System. Formed in 1913, the 
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principal task of the Federal Reserve System is to provide a stable 
monetary system by controlling the money supply and the flow of bank 
credit. National banks must belong to the Federal Reserve System but 
membership is optional for state banks. As of 1979, 5,483 banks belonged 
to the Federal Reserve System out of 14,546 total banks in the United 
States. National banks accounted for 4,495 of the Federal Reserve member 
banks, with the other 998 being state banks. 
Another agency which has regulatory powers over almost all commer­
cial banks in the United States is the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora­
tion (FDIC), which currently insures each depositor up to $100,000 on all 
demand and time deposit accounts. Insurance is voluntary for some state 
chartered non-member of the Federal Reserve banks; however, approximately 
98 percent of all banks carry the FDIC*s insurance. Therefore, the FDIC 
is the only federal agency which has supervisory power over nearly every 
bank in the United States. 
Given these four regulators, there exists some overlap in juris­
diction. To help eliminate multiple examinations of an individual bank, 
one agency is designated as the "main" regulator. This agency's report 
on the soundness of the bank is provided to the other agencies with 
jurisdiction, thereby removing some of the overlap. Multiple examina­
tions still exist for state non-member insured banks. Table 1 details 
this regulatory structure. 
However, other aspects of bank regulation, outside of the examina­
tion process, experience overlapping jurisdiction. This study shall 
be concerned with the regulations concerning banking market structure--
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Table 1. Types of banks and the different regulators 
Type of bank C* 
Regulated by 
FD FDIC® d State 
Main 
regulator(s) 
National X X X X C 
State member X X X F 
State non-member Insured X X FDIC, state 
State non-member non-Insured X state 
^Comptroller of the Currency. 
''Federal Reserve System. 
^Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. 
^State banking commission. 
8 
specifically, branch banking, bank holding companies and bank 
mergers. 
Branch Banking 
Unlike most other countries, the United States has a large number 
of banks, most of which have only one office. The reason for this prob­
ably lies In the fear that having a small number of banks may well lead 
to a banking monopoly. Branching (operating more than one office) Is 
permitted In most states but the laws vary greatly from state to state. 
States can be classified Into three basic groups: 
1) Statewide branching states 
2) Limited branching states 
3) Unit banking states. 
Approximately forty percent of the states permit branching on a state­
wide basis and thirty-five percent permit branching on a more limited 
basis. The term "limited branching" encompasses wide variations among 
the state laws, ranging from branching only where the head office of 
another bank does not exist to branching solely within contiguous counties 
(18). The term "unit banking" refers to states which prohibit branching 
or severely restrict it (i.e., branches only permitted within a certain 
distance from the head office). Table 2 contains a list of classifica­
tion of states as to the status of branch banking. Under the AkFadden 
Act, national banks are subject to the branching laws of the state in 
which they operate. Just as state banks arc. The McFadden Act also 
restricts banks from branching across state lines (22). 
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Table 2. Classification of states as to the status of branch 
banking (7) 
Statewide branching Limited branching Unit banking 
Alaska Alabanui Colorado 
Arizona Arkansas Illinois 
California Florida Kansas 
Connecticut Georgia Minnesota 
Delaware Indiana Missouri 
District of Columbia Iowa Montana 
Hawaii Kentucky Nebraska 
Idaho Louisiana North Dakota 
Maine Massachusetts Oklahoma 
Maryland Michigan Texas 
Nevada Mississippi West Virginia 
New Jersey New Hampshire Wyoming 
New York New Mexico 
North Carolina Ohio 
Oregon Pennsylvania 
Rhode Island Tennessee 
South Carolina Virginia 
South Dakota Wisconsin 
Utah 
Vermont 
Washington 
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Branch banking has been in the past and still is today one of the 
most controversial issues in banking economics. The questions raised 
involve economic efficiency, bank safety and service to customers, as 
well as the effect of branching on competition. Many studies have ana­
lyzed both the advantages and disadvantages of branch banking, but the 
net effect is still a subject of debate (IS; 17; 28). 
An issue related to branch banking is that of Electronic Funds 
Transfer Systems (EFTS), which is the application of conyuter technology 
to banking services. These systems include such devices as automated 
teller machines, point of sale systems, and automated clearinghouses. 
The technology presently exists to operate most of these systems; however, 
certain economic and legal problems exist. From a legal standpoint, does 
an automated teller in a grocery store constitute a "branch" of the bank? 
Many small banks attempt to block, through the branch banking laws, the 
use of EFTS by larger banks. The reason for this opposition by small 
banks involves some of the economic issues related to the use of EFTS. 
EFTS is a high fixed cost service. However, once the system is in 
existence, the marginal costs are fairly low. The necessary requirement 
is a sufficient volume to justify the high initial cost of the system. 
This presents a problem for many smaller banks who may not be able to 
generate the volume necessary to achieve the lower unit costs. However, 
technological advances may eventually make EFTS economically feasible 
for smaller banks (9; 23). 
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Bank Holding Companies 
The growth of bank holding companies (BHCs) during the 1970s in 
the United States has added another controversial topic to discussions 
on bank structure. A holding company is a firm which has a controlling 
interest in one or more banks. As with branch banking, legislation 
concerning bank holding companies varies from state to state. Holding 
company activity is permitted in thirty-seven states, while thirteen 
states prohibit or restrict holding company activity in some way (18). 
These regulations include the power to decide what banks the holding 
company may acquire as well as the type of non-bank businesses in which 
they may engage. 
The reason for these regulations is to insure competition as well 
as bank soundness. For example, the Federal Reserve may wish to restrict 
businesses acquired by the holding conyany to those which the management 
has experience in running or that will not adversely effect the profit­
ability of the banks in the holding company (4). 
The economic questions concerning bank holding companies are 
similar to those on branch banking, such as the competitive effects, 
operating efficiency, the effect on bank soundness and the overall 
effect on the concentration of financial resources (19; 21). Most 
studies concerning bank holding company activity and competition in bank­
ing markets have shown the BHC's effect is basically pro-competitive. 
Holding companies tend to enter market either by foothold or de novo 
entry. And even when the market is entered by merger, the bank's market 
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share seems to show no tendency to increase post-acquisition by a BHC 
(13; 16). However, looking at the broader issues of concentration of 
resources by holding companies, the evidence suggests an anticompetitive 
effect (31). 
Bank Mergers 
The Bank Merger Act of 1960 was enacted in order to require merging 
banks to obtain permission from a federal regulatory agency prior to 
consummation of a merger. In the decade prior to this legislation, there 
had been a large number of mergers, with federal agencies having only 
limited control through regulations on branching. The Bank Merger Act 
gave specific agencies the authority to approve mergers under their 
jurisdiction, as well as established guidelines for use by the agencies 
in their consideration of a proposed bank merger. 
The jurisdiction is as follows: 
1) The approval of the Comptroller of the Currency is required 
if the bank resulting from the merger is to be a national 
bank or a bank in the District of Columbia. 
2) The approval of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System is required if the resulting bank is to be a member of 
the Federal Reserve System, operating under a state charter 
(except if it is in the District of Columbia). 
3) The approval of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation is 
required if the resulting bank is to be a state chartered 
bank which is not a member of the Federal Reserve System 
(except if it is in the District of Columbia). 
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The two non-deciding agencies as well as the Attorney General serve in 
an advisory capacity unless, due to probable bank failure, the merger 
takes place under the emergency provisions of the Act. The Bank ïferger 
Act of 1960 Instructed the deciding agency to look at the following 
three groups of factors before deciding whether to approve the merger. 
1) Banking factors--the financial history and condition of each 
of the banks involved, the adequacy of the capital structure, 
future earnings prospects and management quality. 
2) Convenience and needs of the communities served by the banks--
probable social benefits from the merger. 
3) The effect of the merger on competition. 
After considering all these factors, the agency may approve the merger 
if it is found to be in the public Interest (5). 
Two problems existed with the 1960 Act. First of all, the law 
said nothing about antitrust immunity for bank mergers, which was a 
great disappointment to groups such as the American Bankers Association 
(25). The issue of the applicability of antitrust laws to bank mergers 
was argued in the courts in two landmark cases. 
In the United States vs. Philadelphia National Bank, the Supreme 
Court declared bank mergers to be subject to provisions of the Clayton 
Act (34). In this 1963 case, the Court held that the proposed merger 
of Philadelphia National Bank and Girard Trust, which would have resulted 
in a single bank controlling 36 percent of bank deposits in the four 
county area of metropolitan Philadelphia, was sufficiently anticompetitive 
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to be In violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act. In the 1964 Lexington 
Bank case, the Supreme Court ruled that bank mergers were also subject 
to provisions of the Sherman Act (33). 
The second problem occurred due to a lack of relative weightings 
of the three factors to be considered by the deciding agency. The courts 
have placed far greater weight on the competitive factors, while the 
regulatory agencies have assigned greater weight to the consideration of 
banking factors and convenience and needs issues. For example, in the 
Philadelphia National Bank case, the courts declared that a merger 
violating antitrust laws could not be upheld on the basis of convenience 
and needs considerations (12). 
To rectify these problems, the Bank Merger Act was amended in 1966. 
The amended act assigned greater Importance to the competitive factors 
than the original Act. The deciding agency was not to approve any 
merger that resulted in a monopoly or an attempt to achieve a monopoly 
in banking in any section of the country. However, an anticompetitive 
merger, though not of monopolistic proportions, could be approved if the 
convenience and needs of the community outweighed the anticompetitive 
aspects of the merger. For exao^le, if the merger of two small banks 
was Judged to be anticompetitive, but by merging, the now larger bank 
could offer the community new services, the merger may be approved. The 
amended Act did not provide antitrust immunity but it did set a time 
limit of 30 days, after agency approval, in which the Department of Justice 
must file any action against the merger (6). Since 1966, various cases 
have tested and clarified the new provisions in the amendment (32; 35). 
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There has been much literature devolted to both banking and con­
venience and needs criteria In relation to bank mergers. However, since 
It Is the competitive effects that are weighed most heavily. Chapter III 
will review the studies that have concerned competition In banking. 
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CHAPTER III; COMPETITION IN BANKING: 
A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Banking Markets 
Before one can discuss competition in banking markets and how it is 
measured, one needs to look at what exactly is a banking market. A 
market can be described in two ways; either geographically or by product. 
Both descriptions present problems in defining banking markets. 
Banks can be considered multiproduct firms, that is, firms that 
produce many different products. The products in banking are actually 
services, such as checking and savings accounts, consumer and business 
loans and trust services. A bank may conqpete with different financial 
institutions in these different product markets. How one defines the 
product market has tremendous importance in determining the importance 
of structural changes in banking (39). 
In the past, the definition of the product market by the courts has 
been fairly narrow. In the 1963 Philadelphia National Bank case, the 
Supreme Court found banking Itself to be a unique line of Commerce, where 
the term "banking" refers to the entire range of banking services (34). 
This product market definition was based primarily on the fact that 
banks, at the time, were the only financial institutions permitted by 
law to accept demand deposits. The Court also felt there existed a high 
degree of interdependency between all the bank's services. This position 
was reaffirmed in the Phillipsburg National Bank case in 1970. The 
Court emphasized customers' desires to satisfy all their financial needs 
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at one Institution, making nonbank financial institutions less attractive 
than commercial banks since theee institutions could not have checking 
accounts (35). 
Economic theory has in the past been able to Justify both the view 
of banking itself as a product as well as the bank as a multiproduct 
firm. The interdependency mentioned by the courts between different 
bank services was confirmed in a study done by Murphy (24) of thirty 
Massachusetts municipalities that borrowed in anticipation of tax revenue. 
This study showed that interest rates charged by banks were lowest where 
the banks, which purchased the tax anticipation notes, handled all of a 
town's business instead of merely holding the proceeds of a note issue 
as they were being spent. In other words, there existed a relationship 
between one product sold by the bank (the note purchase) and another 
product (the town's deposit business). 
In order to view a bank as a multiple product firm involved in many 
different markets, economists make the distinction between the business 
and non-business customers of the bank. A main proponent of this broad 
market view is David Alhadeff. He sees banks as financial department 
stores with only limited tie-ins between products. Alhadeff believes 
banks compete strongly with other financial institutions in the credit 
product market. Except for small business loans, banks have been 
competing with finance companies, credit unions, and savings and loans, 
among others, in the consumer and mortgage loan markets. Even in the 
demand deposit markets, many thrift institutions do offer alternatives 
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to holding demand deposits at commercial banks, especially those deposits 
which are held as liquid reserves as opposed to those held for trans­
actions purposes (2; 3). 
Viewing banks as multiple product firms has gained more acceptability 
in recent years due to the growing similarity between financial institu­
tions, especially since the Depository Institutions Deregulation and 
Monetary Control Act of 1980. The demand deposit, which used to be 
the unique product of a commercial bank, is now available at many thrift 
institutions. Thrifts are also able to have a higher percentage of 
commercial and consumer loans in their portfolios (8). This expansion 
of services offered by non-bank financial institutions takes away much 
of the uniqueness of "banking" as a line of commerce and may well cause 
the courts to change the product market definitions in future bank 
merger and holding company cases. 
Alcaly and Nelson in a recent article examined the effect the 
inclusion of thrift institutions in the product market would have on 
hypothesized mergers between the second and third largest banks in bank­
ing markets in New York and New Jersey (1). They found that, given the 
Department of Justice's guidelines for challenging horizontal mergers, 
the Antitrust division would still challenge mergers between large com­
mercial banks in all but ten percent of the local banking markets in 
New York and New Jersey, even with the Inclusion of the thrift institu­
tions. As the data used for this study were from June 30, 1978, it does 
not take into account the recent increased entry of thrifts into pre­
viously bank-dominated services, such as checking accounts. 
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After one has decided on the product market, the next step Is to 
determine the geographic boundaries of the market. One could look at the 
location of customers who are important to competing banks. This 
"demand" market can be delineated by looking at the primary service 
area of a particular bank, which is defined as that geographic area 
from which the banking office draws eighty percent or owre of its 
deposits (30). Where the service areas of two banks overlap could be 
considered a banking market. However, this definition does not take 
into account potential customers, who do not deal with either firm at 
present but could switch, given changes in price. 
Mathis (20) makes the distinction between this demand side approach, 
calling it a trade area delineation, and the definition of a market area. 
The market area should include all firms reacting to the same set of 
competitive forces on either the supply or demand side of the market. 
Prices of all firms within the same market setting should be equal, given 
a homogeneous product. It is this price equalization characteristic 
which is used by Mathis to delineate banking markets. Others have looked 
at a particular service offered by a bank, such as business loans, and 
by use of a customer survey, delineate the location and characteristics 
of these users. The extensive literature on the topic is reviewed in 
David Whitehead's article (36). 
How banking markets should be defined does differ from how they are 
defined for regulatory purposes. Schweitzer (30) discusses the Federal 
Reserve's policy towards market determination in banking. The Fed 
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distinguishes between a simple and a complex market. Simple markets are 
where all sellers are viewed as good alternative sources of supply by 
all customers. For these markets, some sort of price equalization 
study is done to determine the periphery of the market. For complex 
markets, where the market is so large geographically that customers 
do not view every seller as an alternative source of supply, political 
or demographic boundaries may be used. Counties and standard metropolitan 
statistical areas (SMSA) are the most commonly used boundaries though 
Ranally metro areas, which are areas based on census tract and commuting 
patterns, are also used. Where there exists any significant doubts as 
to the accuracy of the market area determination, surveys are used to 
supplement the data already obtained. From a product standpoint, the 
Fed, in the past, has basically focused on deposit services and commercial 
loans. 
Measuring Competition 
Most measures of competition are in essence measures of market 
structure. This presumes that there exists a definite relationship 
between market structure and competitive performance. Whether or not 
this relationship exists in banking will be discussed later. 
Economic theory suggests that a relationship exists between the 
number of firms in an industry and how competitive the industry is. But 
just looking at the number of firms does not say anything about the degree 
of inequality among firms. For this reason, one of the most common 
measures of market structure is the concentration ratio, C, defined as 
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the percentage of the market contributed by the largest few firms. The 
reason for Its widespread use Is the ease of calculation and data 
availability. 
Another measure Is the Herflndahl index, H. This Is calculated by 
squaring and then summing the market shares of all firms In the Industry. 
N 2 
H « E S. where S. is the market share of the ith firm 
1-1 *-
When the Industry Is a perfect monopoly (one firm), H equals one, its 
maximum value. One main advantage to Its use is "the value declines 
with increases In the number of firms and Increases with rising inequal­
ity among any given number of firms (29, p. 58)." Usually a great deal 
of data on individual market share is required to calculate H and for 
many unregulated industries, it is not available. However, in banking, 
it is used frequently as market data is public Information. 
How one defines the variable to be used in calculating either C or 
H is of some significance. In studies on banking market structure, 
the m- 3t commonly used variable is demand deposits. This Is especially 
true for studies done on the size of local banking markets and competition 
between banks in those markets (10). Other variables can and have been 
used such as savings deposits or loans, but other financial institutions 
would probably have to be Included in the Industry. As stated before, 
with the deregulation of banking, it may well be that using demand 
deposits as a variable may soon pose the same problem as do the other 
variables. 
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Structure and Performance 
The relationship between banking market structure and performance 
(as measured by certain market determined variables such as business 
loan rates, checking account service charges, etc.) has been studied 
extensively. Edwards (11) found a small, though statistically signifi­
cant, positive relationship between concentration and business loan 
rates. "There exists in banking markets some relationship between 
market structure and market performance, high concentration being 
associated with less competitive price behavior" (11, p. 300). Rose 
and Fraser found a significant change in the nature of banking services 
offered by established banks upon new bank entry into the market--
greater loan/asset ratios, increased competition for time deposits, all 
seemingly without any adverse effect on bank profitability and growth 
(14). These studies and others indicate the relevance for looking at 
structural changes in banking markets; in this research, the structural 
change was bank mergers. 
Impact of Bank Mergers on Structure 
Most studies done on mergers and their effect on the structure of 
the banking industry have tended to focus on aggregate effects, as 
opposed to looking at individual banking markets. This is due partially 
to problems in defining the relevant banking market as well as the ease 
of calculation of the broader measures of market structure. 
In a 1974 study, Rhoades and Yeats looked at whether or not a con­
solidation movement is underway in the banking industry and if the 
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pattern of mergers Is conducive to this movement (27). They constructed 
a dynamic measure of concentration which Indicated that there had been 
a tendency towards deconsolidation In commercial banking for the years 
1960-1971. However, by looking at the growth rate of deposits among 
different size classes of banks and relating this to merger activity 
within each class, Rhoades and Yeats found that mergers played a role In 
a movement toward consolidation In the banking Industry. This Is espe­
cially true of large banks (greater than $100 million In deposits), 
most likely due to the fact that these larger banks acquired more and 
larger banks than smaller size banks. However, this tendency toward 
consolidation was more than offset by the vigorous internal growth of 
medium-size banks, leading to deconsolidation overall. 
Yeats also did a study, published in 1973, which looked at the influ­
ence alternative merger policies o4ght have had on the size distribution of 
banks (38). Looking at state five-firm concentration ratios as a measure 
of market structure, Yeats attempted to simulate what structural patterns 
would have existed in the absence of mergers in three high-merger activity 
states. In each state, he was able to show that mergers played a signifi­
cant role in shaping the existing market structure. If no mergers had 
been permitted, a significant amount of déconcentration would have 
resulted. 
In another study looking at state concentration ratios and bank 
mergers, done in 1979, Rhoades looked at some of the determinants of 
changes in three- and five-firm state concentration ratios from 1961 to 
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1971 (26). The independent variables tested included number of mergers, 
acquired deposits, dummy variables for whether state law permitted branch­
ing and/oL' multibank holding companies, and growth in state deposits. 
Merger activity had a positive and significant effect on the change in 
state concentration. The dummy variables relating to branching and bank 
holding companies also were positive and significant. Growth was expected 
to have a negative effect on concentration, as Rhoades hypothesized 
increased entry and therefore decrease concentration in high growth states. 
However, growth appeared to have a positive effect on concentration. 
"The financial strength of the larger banking organizations, perhaps 
combined with their experience with expansion, permits them to respond 
comparatively rapidly to growth opportunities" (26, p. 388). 
If Bank A merges with Bank B to become Bank AB, how does bank ABs 
share of the market change over time? The purpose of this research Is to 
answer this question as well as what factors influence these changes. 
Chapter IV details this research. 
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CHAPTER IV: THE MODEL AND RESULTS 
The object of this study is to examine the changes in a bank's 
market share post-merger and identify the factors affecting these 
changes. The factors to be tested include: 
1) Growth in total market deposits. 
High growth in market deposits would probably attract more 
entrants into the market, causing market share to decline. 
However, as in Rhodes' study (26), growth could have a 
positive affect on a bank's market share, if large market 
share banks respond better to growth opportunities than 
small ones. 
2) Bank holding company acquisitions. 
Bank holding company acquisition of a bank has been shown in 
previous studies to have a negative effect on bank market 
share. 
3) State branching laws. 
Market share should be positively effected by more lenient 
branching laws, as this would make it easier for the bank 
to open more offices and thereby Increase their market share. 
4) Size of bank. 
If economies of scale exist in banking, larger banks should 
experience a positive growth in market share due to the 
efficiencies of larger size. 
5) Offices outside of the primary, head office market. 
If linkages between different geographic markets exist, then 
a bank with a wider network of offices should have greater 
market power in its primary market. 
The Data 
Merger reports are published in the annual reports of the three 
deciding agencies; the Comptroller of the Currency, Board of Governors 
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of the Federal Reserve System, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Cor­
poration. The reports summarize the Information used by the agency to 
aoclde whether or not to approve proposed mergers and include the 
product and geographic market definitions used for considering each 
merger. As stated in the previous chapter, the most common product 
market definition used is demand deposits of individuals, partnerships 
and corporations (DIPC). Political boundaries are used primarily to 
define the geographic market. 
From the merger reports of 1973 and 1974, 51 mergers were chosen 
to be included in this study. The criteria for selection are as follows: 
1) All offices of both the acquired and acquiring bank must be 
in the same county or Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area 
(SMSA). 
2) Neither bank must be part of a multibank holding company. 
3) The merger must not be done for purposes of corporate reorgan­
ization or done under the emergency provisions of the Bank 
Merger Act. 
Criterion number one restricts the sample to banks competing at the time 
of the merger only within the same market area. Criterion number two is 
necessary in order to look at the possible effect of holding company acqui 
sition on post-merger market share. Since the study is concerned with 
the competitive effect of mergers, mergers involving problem banks or 
undertaken for corporate reorganization wexe excluded. These criteria 
selected out most very large banks that participated in mergers during 
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Che cime period of Chls study; the Implications of this will be discussed 
In Chapter V. 
Each bank in the United States is assigned a unique number, called 
a certificate number, by the FDIC. If the merged bank retained the same 
certificate number in 1980 as it had Immediately after the merger, the 
bank remained In the sample. Out of the original sample of 51, only 42 
mergers could be used. This is due to some of Che merged banks "dis­
appearing", either through merger with another bank or closure. 
Of interest in this study, is what happened to the market shares 
of these merged banks from the time period 1973-1974 to 1980. Since 
structural changes in local banking markets is of primary Interest, 
the geographic market was defined as the county or SMSA in which the 
banks are located. Though, as stated previously, the use of political 
boundaries is not an economically perfect method of delineating markets, 
it is a simple, reasonably good approximation for a local banking market. 
In order to be more precise, it would be necessary to examine each 
merger on an individual basis, which is beyond the scope of this study. 
From a public policy standpoint, the deciding agencies also use political 
boundaries. So if one wishes to see what happened to banks involved 
In agency-approved mergers. It would be useful to use similar market 
definitions. The product variable used is DIPC since demand deposits 
tend to be local in nature. 
The deposit data necessary for this study was obtained from the 
Summary of Deposit tapes, purchased from the Federal Deposit Insurance 
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Corporation by the Economics Department, Iowa State University. This 
data base contains demand, time, and savings deposit data for every 
Insured commercial bank in the United States for June 30 of each year. 
Deposits are allocated to specific branches of the bank, if branches 
exist, not assigned totally to the banking organization, which makes 
it very useful for any study looking at local markets. Branches are 
named and numbered, as well as county or SMSA location defined. Other 
structural information is also contained on the tape, such as whether 
or not the bank is part of a bank holding company. 
The Regression Model 
Since the object of this study was to examine the changes in a 
bank's market share post-merger and what factors affect these changes, 
a series of simple linear regressions were run to test the significant 
of the factors mentioned in the beginning of this chapter. 
The variables, both independent and dependent, are described in 
Tables 3 and 4. MSM, market share in 1972-1973, is calculated one year 
prior to the merger due to a problem present in the Summary of Deposit 
tapes. As mentioned in the previous section, the deposit data on these 
tapes is collected for June 30 of a given year. The merger reports, 
however, are published for December 31. This six month difference 
requires certain time adjustments in order to calculate combined market 
share of the two banks participating in the merger. For example, if a 
merger occurred in February 1973, it would be recorded as a merger in 
the 1973 report of the deciding agency. However, if one looked at the 
29 
Table 3. Independent variable definitions 
Name Definitions 
MSM Market share one year prior to the merger 
G Growth in county or SMSA deposits 
BHC Dummy variable; * 1 if merged bank is 
acquired by multibank holding company, 
- 0 if not 
UB Dummy variable; * 1 if merger takes place 
in a unit banking state, - 0 if not 
LB Dummy variable; - 1 if merger takes place 
in a limited branching state, * 0 if not 
SZl Dummy variable; * 1 if merged bank's 
deposits are between $0-25M, • 0 if not 
SZ2 Dummy variable; * 1 if merged bank's 
deposits are between $26-50M, - 0 if not 
SZ3 Dummy variable; - 1 if merged bank's 
deposits are between $51-75M, - 0 if not 
SZ4 Dummy variable; = 1 if merged bank's 
deposits are between $76-100M, * 0 if not 
MSG Dummy variable; « 1 if merged bank has 
offices outside the county or SMSA in 
1980, « 0 if not 
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Table 4. Dependent variable definitions 
Name Definitions 
MS80 Market share of merged bank in 1980 
CMS Change in market share from 1972 or 1973 
to 1980 
RMS Relative change in market share 
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Sumnuiry of Deposit tape for 1973, the bank would already show up as 
the merged unit, since the merger occurred prior to June 30. To alle­
viate this problem, MSM Is calculated for one year prior to the year 
the merger was reported In the annual report. States are classified as 
to unit banking or limited branching according to Table 2. The dummy 
variable for statewide branching states is eliminated in order to avoid 
having a singular matrix. All sample banks, as of 1980, had less than 
$100M in DIPC. Therefore, all banks in my sample fall into one of the 
four dummy variables SZl to SZ4. Again, to avoid the problem of a singular 
matrix, only three of the size dummies are run at any one time. Criteria 
number one, mentioned in the previous section, allows Inclusion of MSG 
as a variable, since both banks at the time of merger, in order to be 
in the sample, could have no offices outside the county or SMSA, but 
may have acquired or opened branches between 1973-1974 and 1980. 
Formulas for all variables requiring calculation are listed in 
Table 5. The Appendix presents the actual data used in the study. 
Results with MS80 as the dependent variable 
A series of simple linear regressions were run to determine what 
factors Influenced the market share in 1980. These results are listed 
in Table 6. Regression number one looked at the relationship between 
the merged bank market share in 1980 and the merged bank market share 
in 1972-1973, immediately prior to the merger. The relevant question is: 
Is the coefficient on MSM greater than, equal to or less than one? If 
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Table 5. Formulas for variable calculation 
Name Formula 
MSM 
MS80 
DIPC of acquiring DIPC of acquired 
bank 1972-1973 bank 1972-1973 
DIPC of county or SMSA 1972-1973 
DIPC of county or DIPC of county or 
SMSA in 1980 " SMSA in 1972-1973 
DIPC of county or SMSA 1972-1973 
DIPC of merged bank's offices in county 
or SMSA as of 1980 
DIPC of county or SMSA 1980 
CMS MS80 - MSM 
Table 6. Regressions with MS80 as the dependent variable 
Regression 
number MSM G BHC MSG UB LB SZl SZ2 SZ3 Intercept R2 
1 0.967* (0.021)* 
-0.001 
(0.007) 0.981 
2 0.963* (0.023) 
-0.010 
(0.018) 
0.004 
(0.011) 0.981 
3 0.965* (0.023) 
-0.011 
(0.019) 
0.005 
(0.013) 
0.003 
(0.012) 0.981 
4 
0.970 
(0.024) 
-0.014 
(0.019) 
0.000 
(0.013) 
-0.003 
(0.028) 
-0.019 
(0.016) 
0.020 
(0.019) 0.982 
5 0.971* (0.021) 
0.018 
(0.017) 
-0.008 
(0.021) 
0.021 
(0.021) 
-0.016 
(0.017) 0.983 
6 0.971* (0.022) 
0.013 
(0.013) 
-0.004 
(0.008) 0.981 
7 0.967* (0.023) 
-0.010 
(0.018) 
0.013 
(0.013) 
0.001 
(0.012) 0.982 
8 0.973 (0.024) 
-0.015 
(0.019) 
0.002 
(0.013) 
0.010 
(0.015) 
0.004 
(0.030) 
-0.014 
(0.018) 
0.013 
(0.021) 0.982 
9 0.974 (0.023) 
-0.002 
(0.019) 
0.012 
(0.015) 
0.020 
(0.018) 
-0.005 
(0.022) 
0.017 
(0.022) 
-0.019 
(0.021) 0.983 
10 0.975 (0.022) 
0.012 
(0.015) 
0.020 
(0.017) 
-0.005 
(0.021) 
0.018 
(0.022) 
-0.020 
(0.018) 0.983 
11 
-0.176 
(0.135) 
-0.138 
(0.098) 
-0.022 
(0.197) 
0.063 
(0.114) 
-0.152 
(0.130) 
-0.113 
(0.158) 
-0.184 
(0.165) 
0.416** 
(0.178) 0.191 
12 -0.169 (0.136) 
-0.140 
(0.099) 
-0.085 
(0.116) 
-0.070 
(0.209) 
0.024 
(0.127) 
-0.157 
(0.131) 
-0.134 
(0.161) 
-0.154 
(0.171) 
0.465** 
(0.192) 0.204 
lumbers In parentheses denote standard errors. 
*Slgnlfleantly less than one at the 10% level. 
••Significantly different from zero at the 57. level. 
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It is greater than one, the banks in the sample gained market share 
post-merger. If one assumes that banks participating in mergers are 
more aggressive businesses, this aggressiveness may continue in the years 
after the merger, bringing about an increase in market share. If the coef­
ficient equals one, the banks did not gain market share over time--they 
merely held their original position. If the coefficient is less than 
one, the banks lost market share from 1972-1973 to 1980. This latter 
result appear to be the case in runs one through seven, where the 
coefficient on MSM is significantly less than one at the 10 percent 
level. 
One possible explanation for this finding is that the merger 
originally took place as a defensive move, by banks who feared an eroding 
of their present position at the time of the merger. Since the merged 
banks in the sample are relatively small and with the continued expansion 
of large banks by branching in many states, it does perhaps make sense 
that these smaller banks may well lose market share over time. 
Regressions 2-10 add on the various possible explanatory variables 
which could conceivably influence market share in 1980. However, MSM 
2 has such a great influence on MS80, as signified by the high R in run 
one, that these other variables do not appecr to have any significant 
explanatory power. When MSM is left out of the regressions as in runs 
2 11 and 12, the R drops to 0.191 and 0.204 respectively. Even with MSM 
gone from the regressions, none of the coefficients on the independent 
variables turn out to be significantly different from zero at the 10 
percent level. 
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It Is possible that some of the banks in the sample may have 
participated in subsequent mergers with banks operating in the same 
market area (county or SMSA). This acquired market share would tend to 
raise the coefficient on MSM toward one. To eliminate this bias, it 
would be necessary to subtract the acquired market share, as of 1980, 
from MS80. Merger reports of the three deciding agencies were examined 
from 1973-1974 to 1980. Only one of the merged banks in the sample, 
merged bank L7, participated in an additional merger within its county. 
The market share of those additional branches as of 1980 were subtracted 
out and the regressions re-run. The results are listed in Table 7. 
As was expected, the presence of one additional merger did not appear to 
dramatically alter the results from those of Table 6. For all regres­
sions except number 16, the coefficient on MSM is significatly less than 
one at the 10 percent level, with the coefficients on the other variables 
2 
not significantly different from zero. The R s are, as in Table 6, very 
high when MSM is included as one of the independent variables but fall 
dramatically when MSM is removed as in regression 20. 
Results with CMS as dependent variable 
Since MSM has such strong explanatory power over the other indepen­
dent variables in regressions run with MS80 as the dependent variable, 
a different approach was taken. A series of regressions was run to see 
if the independent variables used in the previous set of regressions 
had an influence on the absolute change in market share (CMS). The 
results of these regressions are listed in Table 8. 
Table 7» Regressions with MS80 less acquired market share as dependent variable 
Regression 
number MSM G BHC MSG UB LB SZl SZ2 SZ3 Intercept R< 
13 0.969* (0.021) 
-0.002 
(0.007) 0.981 
14 0.965* (0.022) 
-0.009 
(0.018) 
0.002 
(0.011) 0.982 
15 0.966* (0.023) 
-0.010 
(0.018) 
0.012 
(0.012) 
0.002 
(0.002) 0.982 
16 0.970 (0.024) 
-0.013 
(0.019) 
-0.002 
(0.013) 
0.003 
(0.027) 
-0.013 
(0.016) 
0.014 
(0.019) 0.982 
17 0.973* (0.021) 
0.017 
(0.016) 
-0.008 
(0.020) 
0.022 
(0.021) 
-0.016 
(0.016) 0.983 
18 0.971* (0.022) 
0.009 
(0.013) 
-0.004 
(0.008) 0.982 
19 0.979* (0.025) 
-0.005 
(0.020) 
0.004 
(0.015) 
0.000 
(0.017) 
-0.006 
(0.030) 
-0.016 
(0.018) 
0.021 
(0.019) 
-0.005 
(0.023) 
0.025 
(0.025) 
-0.007 
(0.030) 0.984 
20 -0.168 (0.136) 
-0.143 
(0.099) 
-0.089 
(0.116) 
-0.065 
(0.209) 
0.028 
(0.127) 
-0.161 
(0.131) 
-0.136 
(0.161) 
-0.155 
(0.170) 
0.464** 
(0.191) 0.211 
hunters in parentheses denote standard errors. 
^Significantly less than one at the 10% level. 
••Significantly different from zero at the 57. level. 
Table 8. Regressions with CMS as the dependent variable 
Regression 
number G BHC UB LB MSO 
21 
-0.006 
(0.017)" 
0.009 
(0.012) 
22 
-0.008 
(0.017) 
0.009 
(0.012) 
0.017 
(0.013) 
23 -0.005 (0.019) 
0.012 
(0.014) 
0.008 
(0.036) 
-0.003 
(0.028) 
0.022 
(0.015) 
24 -0.005 (0.019) 
0.012 
(0.014) 
0.008 
(0.036) 
-0.003 
(0.028) 
0.022 
(0.015) 
25 -0.017 (0.018) 
0.005 
(0.012) 
26 -0.017 (0.018) 
0.005 
(0.012) 
0.014 
(0.013) 
27 
-0.019 
(0.020) 
0.005 
(0.013) 
0.020 
(0.033) 
0.004 
(0.025) 
0.015 
(0.014) 
28 -0.013 (0.021) 
0.008 
(0.015) 
0.008 
(0.036) 
-0.002 
(0.028) 
0.020 
(0.015) 
29 -0.013 (0.021) 
0.008 
(0.015) 
0.008 
(0.036) 
-0.002 
(0.028) 
0.020 
(0.015) 
^Numbers in parentheses denote standard errors. 
^Significantly different from zero at the 10% level. 
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0.028 0.017 0.010 
(0.020) (0.024) (0.027) 
SZl SZ2 SZ3 SZ4 MSM Intercept 
0.014 
0.053 
0.145 
0.145 
0.080 
0.104 
0.116 
0.171 
0.171 
-0.012 -0.018 -0.028 
(0.016) (0.020) (0.020) 
0.023 0.014 0.004 
(0.020) (0.024) (0.028) 
-0.009 -0.019 -0.023 
(0.016) (0.020) (0.020) 
-0.009 
(0.008) 
-0.011 
(0.008) 
-0.033 
(0.038) 
-0.005 
(0.031) 
-0.040* 0.006 
(0.024) (0.012) 
-0.036 0.003 
(0.025) (0.012) 
-0.034 -0.001 
(0.025) (0.028) 
-0.027 -0.019 
(0.027) (0.040) 
-0.027 0.004 
(0.027) (0.032) 
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None of the variables are significant at the 10 percent level with 
2 the exception of MSM In run 25. The R s are lower than In regressions 
with MS80 as dependent variable and MSM as Independent variable but are 
roughly In line with regressions run without MSM as an Independent vari­
able. MSM Is Included In regressions 25 to 29 to account for the fact 
that, for a bank with a high market share, there Is less of a possibility 
of a given percentage Increase In market share than for a bank with a 
low market share. For example, a bank with a 10 percent Initial market 
share could double its market share by gaining an additional 10 percent 
of the market where It would take 40 percent more of the market for a 
bank with an initial 40 percent market share. For this reason, one would 
expect the coefficient on MSM to be negative. However, the coefficient 
on MSM may be negative for a different reason. As MSM rises, MS80-MSM 
naturally falls. So If there is a measurement error In MSM, either high 
or low, it will tend to bias CMS in the opposite direction of the error. 
This would tend to cause the coefficient on MSM to be smaller than it 
would otherwise be. 
To test which relationship is most important, the merged banks were 
divided in half at the median market share in 1972-1973 and regression 
number one was run on both halves of the sample. These results are 
listed in Table 9. For the lower half of the sample, run 40, the coef­
ficient on MSM is significantly less than one at the 20 percent level, 
while for the upper half of the sample It is significant at only much 
higher levels. Run 40 suffers from a degrees of freedom problem since 
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Table 9. Regressions run on sample banks divided at 
MS80 as dependent variable 
the median with 
Regression 
number MSM Intercept Sample 
39 0.990 . (0.040) 
-0.013 
(0.018) upper half 
40 0.917^ (0.088) 
0.006 
(0.008) lower half 
^Standard errors in parentheses. 
^Significantly different from one at the 207. level. 
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the sample size is only 21. This causes the level of significance to 
be much higher (20 percent) than would normally be reported. 
The results of regressions 39 and 40 tend to contradict the explana­
tion that large market share banks have a lower probability of increasing 
their market share by a given percentage than smaller banks. The 
statistically significant negative coefficient on MSM in regression 25 
is, therefore, probably due to the mathematical bias. 
Results with RMS as the dependent variable 
The problem with using absolute change in market share is that it 
does not take into account where the bank started out in terms of market 
share. In order to alleviate this problem, regressions were run with 
relative change in market share (RMS) as the dependent variable. The 
results of those regressions are listed in Table 10. 
Some interesting results come out of these regressions. The coef­
ficient on MSG is significant at the 5 percent level in all runs. 
This suggests that banks with branches outside their head office market 
area tend to do better within that market area than do banks who confine 
2 their offices to their original county. The R s arc also much better 
than those runs in which CMS was the dependent variable, especially 
when MSG is included in the regression. These better results are prob­
ably due to RMS being a better overall measure of how market share changes 
since it Includes initial position in the market which CMS does not. 
Chapter V will summarize the results from all the regressions and 
suggest avenues for future research in this area. 
Table 10. Regressions with RMS as dependent variable 
Regression 
number G BHC UB LB MSO 
30 -0.048 (0.097) 
0.054 
(0.069) 
31 -0.067 (0.093) 
0.051 
(0.066) 
0.163** 
(0.072) 
32 -0.048 (0.103) 
0.016 
(0.076) 
0.010 
(0.193) 
-0.057 
(0.148) 
0.187** 
(0.078) 
33 -0.048 (0.103) 
0.016 
(0.076) 
0.010 
(0.193) 
-0.057 
(0.148) 
0.187** 
(0.078) 
34 
-0.103 
(0.103) 
0.035 
(0.069) 
35 -0.108 (0.099) 
0.035 
(0.067) 
36 -0.113 (0.105) 
0.036 
(0.068) 
0.122 
(0.179) 
0.045 
(0.135) 
0.160** 
(0.076) 
37 -0.084 (0.110) 
-0.003 
(0.078) 
0.009 
(0.193) 
-0.049 
(0.148) 
0.175** 
(0.079) 
38 -0.084 (0.110) 
-0.003 
(0.078) 
0.009 
(0.193) 
-0.049 
(0.148) 
0.175** 
(0.079) 
^Numbers in parentheses denote standard errors. 
••Significantly different from zero at 5% level. 
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SZl SZ2 SZ3 SZ4 MSM Intercept 
0.017 
0.134 
0.221 
0.221 
0.069 
0.164 
0.175 
0.241 
0.241 
0.004 
(0.046) 
-0.015 
(0.044) 
0. 001 -0.135 -0.114 0.063 
(0. 104) (0.126) (0.146) (0.203) 
-0.136 -0.115 -0.001 0.063 
(0.085) (0.108) (0.104) (0.163) 
-0.198 0.077 
(0.137) (0.068) 
-0.152 0.043 
(0.133) (0.067) 
-0.146 -0.005 
(0.137) (0.153) 
0. 026 -0.147 -0.145 -0.136 0.131 
(0. 108) (0.127) (0.150) (0.145) (0.216) 
-0.121 -0.119 0.026 -0.136 0.105 
(0.086) (0.108) (0.108) (0.145) (0.170) 
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CHAPTER V: CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS 
FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
The purpose of this study was to look at what happens to a merged 
bank's market share post-merger and what factors affect how much market 
share changes. As is often the case in economic research, the renults 
of the investigation differed from what had been expected. 
With the continuing concern among the regulators of Increasing 
concentration in banking markets due to merger, one would expect to find 
an increase in market share over time, especially by more aggressive 
merger-oriented banks. However, only one of the banks in the sample 
participated in a subsequent merger in the years 1973 to 1980, and even 
taking that acquired market share into account, it appears as if bank 
market share remains constant, perhaps even declining slightly in the 
seven years after the merger. This may well be due to the overall size 
of the banks in the sample, the average size Is $26M in DIPC. Extremely 
large banks tend to be excluded from the sample due to the criteria used 
to select the same. Smaller banks have experienced lower growth rates 
than larger banks in the period 1960-1971, as demonstrated in Rhoades-
Yeats study previously mentioned (27). If this trend continued in the 
time period of the study, it may well account for the decline in market 
share post-merger. 
What is perhaps most surprising is the lack of significance of most 
other variables tested. One would have expected growth in county or SMSA 
deposits to be negatively related to a change in market share. This 
would be true if higher growth meant greater entry. Perhaps if net 
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entry were accounted for directly instead of using growth as a proxy, 
the results might have been different. The dummy variable represent­
ing the type of branching, 1£ any, allowed by the states, also seem to 
have little explanatory power. This is perhaps due to the fact that the 
majority of the mergers in the saoule took place in limited branching 
states (see the Appendix). Again, the criteria used to select the sample 
seems to have created this problem. Enlarging the sample would probably 
bring about more variation. The sample could be enlarged by eliminating 
part of criteria one, making it necessary only that the banks face each 
other in one particular market. In other words, allow branches to exist 
outside the head office county or SMSA at the time of the merger. This 
would bring more mergers into the sample as well as raise the average 
bank size of the sample. The lack of significance of the various size 
dummy variable may also be related to the lack of a wide range of differ­
ent size banks in the sample. Bank holding company acquisition appears 
to have little effect on market share for the banks in the sample. This 
does not mean that there are not advantages to becoming part of a holding 
company, such as increased profitability. Looking at profitability will 
be discussed later in this chapter. 
The most interesting result is the positive and significant coef­
ficient on MSO, the dummy variable which signifies whether or not the 
merged bank operates offices outside the original county or SMSA, as of 
1980. This result indicates that perhaps there is some sort of market 
linkage between different banking markets. In other words, the existence 
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of offices outside a given banking market helps the bank from a com­
petitive standpoint within their original market. For example, many of 
the bank's customers, especially business customers, may find it advan­
tageous to bank with a firm that has offices spread over many different 
markets, as opposed to those confined to a local area only. Banks who 
branch outside their original market may also be more aggressive com­
petitors within that original market. If these market linkages do exist, 
there may be some validity to claims by many regulators and economists 
of the importance of looking beyond Just the effect on local banking 
markets. 
One possible avenue for further research, in addition to expanding 
the sample size, would be to look at the profitability of these banks 
before and after the merger. Balance sheet data for FDIC Insured banks 
is available from the regulatory agencies on the Report of Condition 
tapes. Ratios such as the return on assets or return on equity could be 
compared to non-merging banks in the same market. A study of this type 
would be of interest to bankers contemplating a merger, as well as the 
regulatory agencies. It is possible that a decline in DIPC market share 
may well occur in conjunction with Increased profitability. For example, 
a decline in demand deposits relative to the market total may well be 
offset by a rise in other, perhaps more profitable, liabilities such as 
certificates of deposits or commercial paper. Looking at market share 
measured by some other variable, such as savings deposits or loans, as 
well as profitability, may provide some insights into bank behavior in 
various markets. 
1 
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APPENDIX: SAMPLE DATA 
Table Al. Sample data 
Merger 
number MSM MS80 MSO G 
Al 0.436 0.384 0 1.106 
A2 0.572 0.638 0 0.642 
B1 0.008 0.010 1 0.836 
D4 0.289 0.244 0 1.167 
El 0.004 0.005 0 0.340 
E2 0.091 0.091 0 0.600 
E3 1.000 1.000 0 -0.282 
ES 0.506 0.446 0 0.325 
E6 0.452 0.375 0 0.346 
E7 0.257 0.269 0 0.160 
FI 0.160 0.100 1 0.431 
F2 0.083 0.062 0 0.511 
F3 0.905 0.846 0 -0.398 
G1 0.224 0.238 0 0.186 
G2 0.386 0.349 0 0.120 
G3 0.104 0.130 0 0.044 
J1 0.009 0.008 0 0.425 
Kl 0.062 0.047 0 0.641 
Hl 0.539 0.500 0 0.246 
H2 0.480 0.451 0 0.215 
H3 0.017 0.015 0 0.465 
L5 0.003 0.004 1 0.469 
L6 0.385 0.413 0 0.141 
L7® 0.120 0.153 1 0.395 
BHC UB LB SZl SZ2 SZ3 SZ4 
1 0 1 0 0 0 1 
0 0 1 1 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 1 0 
0 0 1 0 1 0 0 
0 0 1 1 0 0 0 
0 0 1 1 0 0 0 
0 0 1 1 0 0 0 
0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
0 0 1 1 0 0 0 
0 0 1 1 0 0 0 
0 0 1 1 0 0 0 
0 0 1 1 0 0 0 
0 0 1 1 0 0 0 
1 0 1 0 0 0 1 
0 0 1 0 1 0 0 
0 0 1 1 0 0 0 
0 1 1 0 0 0 
1 0 0 1 0 0 
0 0 1 1 0 0 0 
0 0 1 0 1 0 0 
1 0 1 1 0 0 0 
1 0 1 0 0 0 1 
0 0 1 1 0 0 0 
1 0 1 1 0 0 0 
Ml 0.193 0.174 0 0.360 
M3 0.030 0.041 1 0.372 
M4 0.198 0.149 0 0.361 
MS 0.433 0.498 1 0.394 
MIO 0.112 0.093 0 0.385 
Mil 0.188 0.182 0 0.326 
M12 0.118 0.101 0 0.361 
N1 0.112 0.132 0 0.237 
N2 0.202 0.200 0 -0.066 
N3b 0.166 0.163 0 0.364 
N4 0.091 0.119 0 0.313 
N5 0.208 0.192 1 0.313 
N6 0.112 0.119 0 0.522 
N7 0.280 0.271 0 0.555 
02 0.060 0.072 0 1.084 
Q1 0.045 0.046 0 0.254 
SI 0.003 0.003 0 0.581 
S2 0.264 0.220 0 0.523 
^Acquired market share = 0.033. 
^Boundary MSM of lower half of sample. 
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